Unenforceable Trusts and the Rule against Perpetuities by Clark, George L.
University of Michigan Law School
University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository
Articles Faculty Scholarship
1911
Unenforceable Trusts and the Rule against
Perpetuities
George L. Clark
University of Michigan Law School
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/articles/1150
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/articles
Part of the Estates and Trusts Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Articles by an authorized administrator of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more
information, please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu.
Recommended Citation
Clark, George L. "Unenforceable Trusts and the Rule against Perpetuities." Mich. L. Rev. 10 (1911): 31-41.
UNENFORCIBLE TRUSTS AND THE RULE AGAIN§T
PERPETUITIES.
B EQUESTS upon trust to erect a monument to the memory of
either the testator or another have generally been held valid ;1
so also have bequests upon trust to say masses for the repose
of the soul of the testator or another, 2 or to free the testator's
slaves,3 where such provisions were not positively in violation of the
local law. In all these cases, the trust, though valid, is an unenforc-
ible one. If the trustee wishes to carry it out he may do so and no
one can prevent him; if he does not wish to do so, he can not be
held liable for a breach of trust for thus refusing, because there is
no cestui que trust to bring the suit.4 in Trii ner v. Danby," the
testator had bequeathed ii,ooo for -the erection of a monument to his
memory in St. Paul's Cathedral. In holding the provision valid
the court said: "I do not suppose that there would be any one who
could compel the executors to carry out this bequest and raise the
monument; but if the residuary legatees or the trustees insist upon
the trust being executed, my opinion is that this court is bound to
see it carried out. I think, therefore, that as the trustees insist upon
the trust being executed according to the directions in the will, that
sum must be set apart for the purpose." In Clelazd v. Waters,
6 the
testator had directed the executors to free his slaves. The court
held the direction valid, saying: "And though the slave may have
no legal right in the premises by reason of his legal incapacity and
no remedy for such rights as he may have, still, if by the law of the
testator's will, the executor has the right to send him out of the-
country, he may, in this way, of course, be legally emancipated. At
all events, if the executor in such a case does send him out of the
country, no one can gainsay him. The executor's right and duty in
the premises are prescribed by the law of the testator's will. Where
there is no municipal law forbidding it, the testator can certainly
1 Masters v. Masters, z P, Vms. 423 (bequest of £oo for a monument to the tea-
tator's mother); Detwiller v. Hartman, 37 N. 3. Eq. 347 (bequest of $40,000 for a
monument to the testator).
2Reichenbach v. Quin. 21 L. R. Irish, 138 (bequest of £ioo for masses for the
repose of the souls of the testator, and of her father, mother, brother, sisters and ser-
vant).
3 Ross v. Duncan, Freem., Ch. 587; Cleland v. Waters, i9 Ga. 35, 6x.
' In jurisdictions which hold that a gift upon trust to say masses is a tharlty, the
trust is, of course, enforcible like all other charitable trusts, by the State acting through
the Attorney General. Schouler, petitioner, 134 Mass. 426.
25 L. . Ch. 424,
629 Ga 35, 61.
MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW
make such a law for himself in his will, and the same reason exists
why the executor should carry it into effect, as why he should erect
a monument or tombstone of specified character and cost, if so
directed by the testator's will. It will not be disputed, I suppose,
that if such directions were given by a testator, it would be the duty
of his executor to carry them into effect (especially if they were
reasonable), and that he would be sustained by a Court of justice
in so doing, or instructed so to do by a Court of Equity if he asked
instructions on this head. Yet, it could not be said that the tomb-
stones had any right in the premises, or perhaps, that any remedy
lay against the executors, by Which the erection of the stone could
be enforced."
Bequests upon trust to use the income thereof each year in keeping.
a monument or grave in repair,? or in saying masses," or in having
a brass band to play at the testator's grave each year 
on the anniver-
sary of the testator's death9 have been held invalid, and the reason
given is that the gift is a "perpetuity"1 or is in "violation of the rule
againstperpetuities."'1 What do the courts mean by calling such a
gift a "perpetuity?" And in what way, if at all, could the bequest
be so changed as to avoid the "rule against perpetuities" and thus
make the gift valid?
It is the policy of the law that property shall, in general, be
freely alienable. Based upon this policy is the rule that direct at-
tempts to restrain the alienation of specific property are void.
Thus, if A conveys certain property to B and imposes a condition
that B shall not alien it, the condition is leld bad, and B may hold
the property free from the condition. Equity has followed the
'common law in this respect except that in some jurisdictions the
alienation of an equitable life estate may thus be restrained; a clause
taking- away the power of a married woman to alienate her separate
equitable estate is generally held valid, but this is not an exception
to the- above rule because the married woman's power to alien was
given by courts of equity and therefore they might very properly.
hold valid a provision taking it away.
Is it an attempted restraint upon alienation to give property upon
trust to devote the income therefrom indefinitely to the care and
repair of a monument or grave or to the saying of masses? It is not
'Johnson v. Holifield, 79 Ala. 423 (bequest of $x,ooo to county commissioners, to be
held in perpetuity in trust, to expend thi income upon a monument to be erected to the
testator).
8Dillon v. Reilly, 1. R., o 3q. xs2.
ODetwiller v. Hartman, 37 N. J. Eq. 347.
"Rickard v. Robson, Va BeaV. 244; Fowler v. Fowlers 33 Beav. 616.
. Hoare v. Osborne, L. R. x Eq. 58S.
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an attempt to restrain the alienation of any particular piece of tang-
ible property, since the trustee would usually have the power to sell
the specific property bequeathed and invest the proceeds even if
such power were not expressly given by the will. But that is also
true of attempts by direct provisions to restrain the alienation of
equitable interests generally; if property be conveyed to T in fee
upon trust for C in fee with a proviso that C shall not alien his inter-
est, such proviso is within the rule prohibiting restraints upon alien-
ation, though T may have the power to sell the specific property con-
veyed to him and thus change the investment. In a gift upon trust to
devote the income therefrom indefinitely to the care of a monument
or grave or to say masses or to have a brass band play each year at
the testator's grave there is obviously no one who can alienate the
beneficial interest in the property; hence such a gift is properly held
bad as an attempted restraint upon alienation. In fact, it is an
extreme instance of attempted restraint since the restraint is to last
forever. Now when the courts speak of such a gift as a "perpetu-
ity" or an "attempt to create a perpetuity," they are using the term
as meaning an attempt to restrain perpetually-i. e., for an indefinite
time-the alienation of the. beneficial interest in the property; and
when they speak of this as being in "violation of the rule against
perpetuities," they have in mind a rule which is a part of the more
general rule against restraints upon, or suspension of, alienation.
Unfortunately, the terms "perpetuity" and "rule against perpetu-
ities" are also used to mean a very different thing; and worse still,
the terms are frequently so used that it is difficult to tell which kind
of a "perpetuity" or which "rule against perpetuities" the qpurt
had in mind. To take a common illustration, if an estate be given
to A, a bachelor, for life, with remainder to his eldest son for life,
with remainder in fee to the eldest son of such son, the estate thus
attempted to be provided for -the grandson is called a "perpetuity"
and is invalid as within the "rule against perpetuities." This rule
against perpetuities has been formulated by Professor Gray as fol-
lows :12 "No interest is good unless it must vest, if at all, not later
than twenty-one years after some life in being at the creation of
the interest." In the example put the grandson's estate was conting-
ent upon the birth not only of a son but of the grandson; and the
grandson might not be born until more than twenty-one years after
A's death; therefore the grandson's estate is invalid because pro-
hibited by the rule.
A perpetuity here means a gift which by its terms is to vest upon
12 Gray, Rule Against Perpetuities, Ld. , § 201.
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a contingency which may happen too far in the future, and the
rule holding such interests invalid should have been called-for the
sake of clearness,-the rule against remoteness"3 rather than the
rule against perpetuities. Two main points of dissimilarity will
bring out the contrast between the two rules. The first rule applies
no matter whether the gift upon trust to use the income is an im-
mediate, vested gift, or a contingent one. For example, if a gift
be'made upon trust for A in fee, but if A should die without issue,
then upon trust to devote the income each year to keeping A's grave
in repair, the contingent provision as to the care of the monument
would be bad because it is a perpetuity in the first sense-i. e., an
attempt to make a perpetual restraint upon alienation. The gift
would have been invalid if it had been vested and of course the fact
that it is contingent does not cure the invalidity.
On the other hand, the second rule applies only to contingent
interests; if the interest vests at once, the rule does not apply, even
though it might not come into possession until after the period.
For example, if a conveyance be made to A for life, remainder to his
children as tenants in common for life, remainder in fee to B, B's
estate is goo4 because it is vested in interest at once though it may
not come into possession until more than twenty-one years after
the death of both A and B.
The other main point of difference is this: while the first rule is
a part of the general rule against restraints upon alienation, the
second rule applies even though the "perpetuity"-i. e., the remote'
contingent interest-would be freely alienable, if it were valid.
Thus in Winsor v. Mills,14 an agreement between A and B giving to
B, his heirs and assigns an option to purchase at any time for a
certain price a piece of land owned by A was held invalid because
the option might not be exercised until more than twenty-one years
after the death of both A and B; yet this contingent equitable inter-
est in the land could have been released by B or his successors at
any time.15
Though the two rules are aimed at quite dissimilar objects, they
do sometimes operate to bring about a similar result. Though the
second rule, as we have just seen, is not aimed directly at restraints
upon alienation, yet the operation of the rule in holding remote
contingent interests void may eliminate a flaw in the value of the
preceding interest and in that sense and to that degree render it
33 Gray, Rule Against Perpetuities, Xd. a, 1 z.
1 137 M2ss. 362.
USee also Starclher Bros. v. Duty,'6x W. Va. 37? and 373.
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more freely alienable. Thus, if property be conveyed to A for life,
remainder to his children as tenants in common in fee, but if the
children all die under twenty-five, then to B in fee, B's interest is too
remote and bad. The effect of holding it bad is to give the children
of A an absolute estate which is much more marketable than if the
contingent estate to B were valid.
The answer, then, to the first question asked at the beginning of
this article is this: in cases of gifts upon trust to devote the income
each year indefinitely to the care of a grave or monument or to say
masses for the repose of the testator's soul, the courts in calling
such gifts "perpetuities" must have in mind the first rule discussed
above and not the second, because the gifts in such cases are vested
and not contingent, the second rule applying only to contingent in-
terests. Such gifts are held bad because the donor contemplated
and attempted to provide that the beneficial interest in the fund
would be forever inalienable; and the only way to hold the restraint
upon alienation void is to hold such a disposition of the beneficial
interest itself void; there will then be a constructive trust for the
donor or his representatives.
There still remains to be considered the second question: "In
what way, if at all, could such a bequest be changed so as to avoid
the 'rule against perpetuities' and thus make the gift valid ?" Can the
time be so limited that the gift will not be a "perpetuity?" And if
so, what is that limit of time?
Professor Gray seems to take the position 16 that trusts for the
saying of masses and for the freeing of slaves where no indefinite
period of time was involved should have been classed as charities.
and upheld on that ground; that there are no valid unenforcible
trusts except those for funeral expenses, including the building of
monuments, this exception being based upon necessity; and that the
real objection to trusts to apply the income for the perpetual care
of monuments or graves or the saying of masses or the playing of a
brass band at the testator's grave each year is not that they are to
endure indefinitely but because there is no cestui que trust to enforce
them. If such a contention should now be adopted judicially, the
consideration of the first question raised in the article-what the
courts have meant by calling such gifts perpetuities-would be-
come a question of psychology rather than of law; while the second
question would be wholly eliminated because it could not possibly
arise.
ISee zS Harv. . Rev. 509-S30 (Gifts for a Non-Charitable Purpose); Gray, Rule
Against Perpetuities, Ed. 2, 1 go4-19o9.
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There is much to be said for Professor Gray's contention; it
Would make the law on this point much more easily understood and
no great harm would be done by holding such -bequests void no mat-
ter how short their duration, since the legislature may easily inter-
fere, if desirable, and fix a limit by statute. There seem, however,
to be few, if any, decisions which hold such gifts bad on the ground
of there being no cestui que trust; and practically, if not entirely
all of them do say that the reason why such gifts are bad is becau ,e
they are "perpetuities." This being true, it seems at least question-
able whether Professor Gray's contention will soon be adopted by
the courts; and in the meantime it may not be amiss to inquire
whether-if the courts do not see fit to take such a position-there
is any period of time which they are likely to fix as being a valid
'duration for such trusts.
In 1828 the New York legislature passed a statute regulating the
subject of perpetuities. The main provisions of this statute are as
follows: "Every future estate shall be void in its creation, which
,shall suspend the absolute power of alienation for a longer period
than is prescribed in this article. Such power of alienation is sus-
pended, when there are no persons in being, by whom an absolute
fee in possession can be conveyed. The absolute power of alienation
shall not be suspended by any limitation or condition whatever, for
a longer period- than during -the continuance of not more than two
lives in being at the creation of the estate." This statute was appar-
ently framed upon the theory that the direct object of the rule
against perpetuities was to limit restraints upon alienation; whether
the framers had in mind that there were really two rules, at common
law, one aimed at certain kinds of restraints upon alienation and
the other at the remoteness of vesting of contingent interests, seems
at least doubtful.17
What is the answer to our question under a statute similar in
terms to the New York statute? The question does not seem to
have arisen squarely, but the inference to be drawn from the
reading of the statute itself and two cases thereunder is that a be-
quest upon trust to devote the income to the care of a monument
or grave or for any other non-charitable purpose which is not posi-
tively illegal, would be valid if the trust is limited in its duration to
IT Until quite recently it was supposed that there was no other rule against perpe-
tuities in New York except this statutory one. But the case of In re Wilcox, x94
N. Y. 288, decided that the common law rule against remoteness was in force in New
Ybrk-with the modification of the period to two lives-and hence the fact that a con-
.tia.gfsqt interest was -alienable did not make it 'good unless it must vest, if at all, within
two lives in being. See 9 Col. L. Rev. for a Aiscussion of this case.
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two lives in being. In Read v. Williams,"
8 the court said: "It is
not contended that 'the provision setting apart a trust fund to be
perpetually kept by the executors and trustees and their successors,
and directing the application of the income for cemetery purposes,
can be upheld. These provisions are manifestly void as involving an
unlawful suspension of -the power of alienation." In Driscoll v.
.Hewlett,19 the testator left the residue of his estate to a church
corporation, "to invest and keep invested the same, and tb collect
the income derived therefrom and devote it in caring for my burial
plot in the cemetery connected with said church." The testator's
next of kin contested the validity of this bequest, the argument of
their attorneys being that it was invalid "because it suspends the
power of alienation beyond the statutory period of two lives in
being," apparently conceding that if the trust had beefi thus limited
in duration it would be valid. The court seemed to agree that this
contention was sound unless the case came within the Statute of
1895; in their opinion the court said: "The donees of the residuary
estate are a religious corporatioti and the gift constitutes a trust for
its administration, which, for involving perpetuity, would be void,
unless saved by some statute." -The court then decided that the
bequest was valid because it came within the Statute of 1895 which
authorized gifts to religious corporations for cemetery purposes.
If the inference drawn above should prove, by later decisions, to
be sound, the result would be that in New York and other states
having similar legislation, the period beyond which a contingent
estate will be too remote is the same period during which an unen-
forcible trust for definite lawful purposes may be validly created.
Hence a bequest to trustees upon trust to devote the income there-
of to the care of the testator's tomb during the continuance of the
lives of Adam Brown, Charles Dawson and Edward Fell and then
upon trust to divide the fund equally between the children then
living of Geoffrey Hall, bachelor, both gifts would be invalid; while
if the name of- Edward Fell be stricken out above, leaving only the
two lives of Adam Brown and Charles Dawson, both gifts would
be valid.
In jurisdictions which do not have legislation on the subject, there
are two periods, either of which might be adopted by the courts
with some degree of reasonableness. One is the period of lives in
being, in analogy to the law of spendthrift trusts; the other is twenty-
one years after lives in being which is the period within which
23 12S N. Y. 56o, at 567.
2 1x98 N. Y. 297.
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contingent remainders must vest in order to be valid. It might
be argued for the second suggestion that this period is one to which
the legal mind is already accustomed; and that while there is, as
we have seen, no logical connection between the two rules against
"perpetuities," yet they have been confused so long that it would
be comparatively easy to establish such a period judicially; fuither-
more, this would be in analogy to the situation which seems to
prevail in States, like New York, which have a statutory rule against
perpetuities; and it might also be urged that this suggestion is bet-
ter than the first in that it allows to the testator a fixed number of
years, not subject to the uncertainties of life, during which he may
feel fairly sure that his wishes will be carried out. In favor of the
first suggestion-if the second should not be adopted,-it may be
argued that, in those jurisdictions which allow spendthrift trusts,
there ought to be no greater objection, from the standpoint of
public policy, in holding valid a direction to apply -the income of a
trust fund to a definite lawful purpose during the existence of
lives in being, than in holding valid a direction to hold property
upon trust during the lifetime and for the benefit of individuals
who are not allowed to alien their interests but who may enjoy their
property free from their creditors; if a restraint upon alienation is
valid during a life or lives in the one case, why should it not be in
the other just "as well?
Although there are several cases both in England and the United
States holding that such bequests with no time limit are void as
being "perpetuities," there seem to be a very few from which any
inference can be drawn as to what the courts would probably con-
sider a lawful period of duration. In Lloyd v. Lloyd
2 0 the testa-
tor's will provided as follows: "And further I desire that my wife,
Lucy Lloyd and Mary Martha Lockley shall, out of the annuity
they receive, keep in good, sound repair the tomb and vault in Chat-
ham church yard, that belongs to me, and cause to be painted the
said tomb and vault every four years, or, if required, more fre-
quently, and in default or failure they shall lose and forfeit their
claim to the annuity, and any. person thereafter that shall receive
the annuity shall be bound to perform the same conditions." In
respect to this provision the court said: "I am satisfied that a
direction simply for keeping a tomb in repair is not a charitable use
and is not of itself illegal. It may be illegal to vest property in
trustees in perpetuity for such a purpose. But the direction that
the widow and M. M. Lockley shall, out of their life interest, keep
- 2 Sim, N. S. SOS.
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the tomb in repair, etc., is quite lawful, and they are under an obli-
gation out of their annuities to do so according to the direction of
the will."
Another cas6 which seems to intimate that the period of lives in
being would be a satisfactory limit is Leonard v. Haworth,
21 in
which the court said: "While a testamentary provision for the
preservation, adornment and repair of a private monument may be
void as creating a perpetuity.for a use not charitable, this provision
[to pay the funeral expenses of the widow and to erect a suitable
tablet at the head of her grave] is open to no such objection, as it
would be completely performed upon the decease of the testator's
wife." The case of Angus v. Daltonj
2 2 seems to make a similar
suggestion. In that case one of the provisions of the will of the
testatrix was "our graves to be kept clean, and flowers once in a
while, to show that you have not forgotten us." The court said:
"She established a trust which was to endure, at least, during a
number of lives. It was her wish that throughout this period her
estate should be kept as it was. The reference to adorning the,
graves with 'flowers once in a while; to show that you have not for-
gotten us,' indicates something to be done by those who, -like the
executors she named, had been personally acquainted with her, and
so that she did not look forward to a perpetual trust to be adminis-
tered by and for those to whom she would be unknown except by
name."
There are two more cases which deserve attention, one suggest-
ing and the other holding a fixed number of years to be a valid
period for a non-charitable bequest. In In re DeaZ,
28 the testator
made the following bequests: "I give to my trustees my eight -horses
and ponies (excluding cart horses) at Littledown, and also my
hounds in the kennels there. And I charge my said freehold estates
hereinbefore demised and devised, in priority of all other charges
created by this my will, with the payment to my trustees for the
term of fifty years, commencing from my death, if any of the said
horses and -hounds shall so long live, of an annual sum of £750.
And I declare that my trustees shall apply the said annual sum
payable to them under this clause in the maintenance of the said
horses and hounds for the time being living, and in maintaining the
stables, kennels, and buildings now inhabitated by the said animals in
such condition of repair as my trustees may deem fit, etc." In
discussing the validity of the bequest the court said: "It is obviously
n 1 Mass. 496.
73 Conn. 56, 63.
M41 Ch. Div. SSa.
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not a charity, because it is intended for the benefit of the particular
animals mentioned, and not for the benefit of animals generally.
* * * Then it is said, that there is no cestui que trust who can
enforce the trust, and that the court will not recognize a trust un-
less it is capable of being enforced by some one. I do not assent
to that view. There is not the least doubt that a man may, if he
pleases, give a legacy to trustees, upon trust to apply it in erecting
a monument to himself, either in a church or in a churchyard, or
even in unconsecrated ground, and I am not aware that such a trust
is in any way invalid, although it is difficult to say who would be the
cestui que trust of the monument. In the same way, I know of
nothing to prevent the gift of a sum of money to trustees upon trust
to apply it for the repair of such a monument. In my opinion such
a trust would be good, although the testator must be careful to limit
the time for which it is to last, because, as it is not a charitable trust,
unless it is to come to an end within the limits fixed by the rule
against perpetuities, it would be illegal. But a trust to lay out a
certain sum in building a monument, and the gift of another sum
in trust to apply the same to keeping that monument in repair, say
for ten years, is, in my opinion, a perfectly good trust, although I
do not see who could ask the Court to enforce it."
Besides the express suggestion that a trust for ten years would
be valid, the court also impliedly suggests that it would be valid
"if it came to an end within the limits fixed by the rule against per-
petuities," apparently meaning the period of twenty-one years after
lives in being, within which period contingent future estates must
vest in order to be valid. While it was extremely unlikely-consid-
ering the average age of horses and dogs,--that these particular indi-
viduals, being probably old favorites of the testator, would'. live
longer than twenty-one years after the death of his trustees, the
bequest is not so drawn as to conform to this period. Conceivably
some of the horses or dogs might live longer than this; but this
point was not raised. Nowhere in the case does the court attempt to
lay down a rule that such a trust would always be good if limited
in duration to the lives of horses and dogs, and can hardly be con-
sidered an authority for such a proposition, taking into considera-
tion the extracts from their decision quoted supra.
2
1
"In criticising this case, Professor Gray, (Rule Against Perpetuities, § 9o6), after
pointing out that the trust might last conceivably for more than twenty-one years aftei
the extinction of all human lives, continues: "It is a novel idea that the validity of a
limitation over (or of a trust) may depend upon whether the limitation must happen (or
the trust determine) within the lifetime of an animal, Can a gift over be made to take
effect upon the death of any animal however longevous,--an elephant, a crow, a carp,
a crocodile, or a toad?" The facts of the case did not involve any question about the
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In Pirbright v. Salwey,25 "a testator, after expressing a wish to
be buried in the inclosure in which his child lay in the churchyard of
E, bequeathed to the rector of and churchwardens for the time be-
ing of the parish church £8oo Consols to be invested in their joint
names, the interest and dividends to be derived therefrom to be ap-
plied, so long as the law for the time being permitted, in keeping up
the inclosure, and decorating the same with flowers. Held, that the
gift was valid for at least a period of twenty-one years from the
testator's death, and semble that it was not charitable."
In conclusion, if a case should arise of an unenforcible trust for
a purpose not unlawful in itself, it would seem a fair prediction that
such a trust would be held valid if it should be limited in duration
to a period not longer than twenty-one years after lives in being at
the creation of the trust.
GEoRGE L. CLARK.
UNIRSITY OF MICHIGAN.
vesting of contingent interests; but it is to be noted that although Professor Gray con-
tends that the trust should have been held bad upon the simile ground that there was
no cestui qub trust to enforce it. he seems to assume that if such trusts are held valid
at all, the same period within which contingent interests must vest in order to be vAlid
would apply to the duration of such trusts, and vice versa.
2Weekly notes for x896, p. 86. Not having access to the original report, the abo#e
statement of the ease has been copied verbatim from" Gray, Rule Against Perpetuitles.
Ed. a, § 9o7.
